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 [Abstract] 
This paper addresses Chinese interrogation rules from historical and 
comparative perspectives by relating them to the very different development of 
interrogation procedure in Europe. A fuller understanding of the evolution of 
the rules in both contexts is relevant to the present day controversy concerning 
the universal versus relative nature of interrogation fairness. The comparative 
analysis reveals that, in fact, the influence of ancient Greek and Chinese 
civilizations resulted in a great difference between Europe and China regarding 
legal cultures and institutional arrangements for criminal interrogation 
procedure. Considering future legal reforms in China, and given the very 
different historical and institutional context, the likelihood seems low that an 
‘autonomous version’ of the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-
incrimination will develop on China’s very different soil. However, traditional 
native resources are also available to legal reformers to ensure a cooperative 
interviewing style in criminal questioning, and eliminate police-coerced 
confessions. 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, a number of high profile wrongful convictions have plagued 
the Chinese criminal justice system.1 While each of these cases has raised serious 
questions concerning the justice system as a whole, particular attention has been 
directed towards the police and their ability to satisfy their dual mandate to 
investigate a crime while protecting the rights and freedoms of the accused. One 
notable aspect of police operations that has come under increasing scrutiny in 
this regard is the police interrogation, a practice which is both upheld by police 
officers as a crucial means of gathering information and disposing cases, and 
denounced by legal scholars and civil rights advocates as a serious threat to the 
standards of fairness and due process (Wu, 2006a; Chen, 2007). Many Chinese 
                                                             
1 For instance, in 2005, the wrongful convictions of Li Jiuming, Nie Shubin, and She 
Xianglin precipitated a growing crisis of legitimacy within the Chinese criminal 
justice system (Chen, 2007:54). 
2 
 
scholars, relying on different sources, including interviews with present and 
former law enforcement officers or individual field observations, have made the 
alarming assertion that the malady of confessions produced by torture 2 
(xingxunbigong, 刑讯逼供) has been widespread in China (Wu and Vander Beken, 
2010). The majority view among researchers was that dominated by ideology of 
‘crime control’ rather than ‘due process’, the current Criminal Procedure Law 
(CPL) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and relevant supplementary 
regulations fail to provide the suspect with adequate safeguards against 
pernicious interrogation practices (Zuo 2005; Bi 2007). 
 
In fact, the problem of coercive police confession has been so pervasive in 
China that it has captured the attention not only of domestic academic scholars 
but also of the international community.3 In the face of such ‘devastating’ issues, 
unsurprisingly, the growing power of the international human rights movement 
has led to a backlash in China (Peerenboom, 2003:1). Notably, activists have 
argued that there is a significant level of consensus regarding ‘the presumption 
of innocence’ and ‘the privilege against self-incrimination’ as set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 4 and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)5 (Gelatt, 1982). Hence, in the 
name of universal human rights, rights activists urge the PRC to comply with 
these ‘universal’ norms (Gelatt, 1982). 
 
The Chinese government, however, has raised serious challenges to this 
claim of universality, arguing that all moral values, including human rights, are 
relative to the social and cultural context in which they arise (Peerenboom, 2003), 
and the law’s very existence depends on its interpretation and application 
within an interpretative community, which is historically and culturally 
conditioned (Zhu, 2007). In particular, the government feels uneasy about some 
‘undeniable’ principles in western criminal procedures, such as the presumption 
of innocence and the privilege against self-incrimination (Gelatt, 1982; Ren, 
2007). The officials in the legislative body of the Standing Committee of the 
                                                             
2 The Chinese academics define torture in a broader sense than the CAT does. They 
define torture as any act by which corporal treatment or quasi-corporal treatment is 
inflicted by judicial officers on a suspect or defendant to extract confessions (Zhe, 
2005). Corporal treatment refers to physical coercion through inflicting pain directly 
on the body, such as a beating or imparting an electric shock. Quasi-corporal 
treatment refers to physical or psychological coercion through inflicting pain 
(physical or mental) indirectly on the body, such as through sleep deprivation, 
exposure to cold or heat, or being forced to sit or stand in uncomfortable positions. 
3 See, for instance, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA17/094/2008/en/bb7a7607-8f0b-11dd-
8d03-3f760a3cc4a3/asa170942008en.pdf and 
http://www.falunhr.org/reports/PDFs/ShadowReportOnChina2008.pdf. 
4 Article 11 of the UDHR. 
5 Article 14 of the ICCPR. 
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National People’s Congress explained that the Chinese approach to criminal 
investigation is to engage neither in the ‘presumption of guilt’ nor in the 
‘presumption of innocence’ (Ma and Li, 1999: 63). The Chinese criminal 
procedure does not presume anything—it lets evidence and facts speak (Gelatt, 
1982). 
 
Competing claims about the universal versus relative nature of interrogation 
fairness reflect one of the main challenges confronting international legal 
instruments and comparatists: how can the competing claims of cultural 
relativism and fair universal interrogation standards be reconciled? This paper 
addresses the Chinese interrogation rules from a historical and comparative 
perspective by relating them to the very different development of police 
interrogation procedure in Europe. The purpose of this comparative analysis is 
twofold. On the one hand, only after a deeper understanding of different social 
and legal systems can one begin to ascertain the proposition that, in the area of 
interrogation procedure, there exists a ‘common core’ of problems among 
various legal systems, notwithstanding momentous differences in political, 
cultural, and legal outlooks. On the other hand, by exploring the historical, 
political, and philosophical backdrop of current Chinese reforms, it is easier for 
(Western) legalists to understand how the right and the privilege in China will 
develop along a different path. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. The first section documents the rise of 
ancient Greek and Chinese civilizations from roughly the eighth to the third 
century B.C. and illustrates their implications for European and Chinese legal 
cultures. This is followed by an analysis of the evolution of criminal 
interrogation rules in Europe. The paper will then focus on the history of 
criminal interrogation rules in China, for which a comparative analysis is 
provided. The last section presents the conclusion. 
 
2 Ancient Greek and Chinese Civilizations: 
Different Perspectives on Law 
From roughly the eighth to the third century B.C., many civilizations made 
great strides in philosophical and moral thought, notably those of Greece and 
China. The influence that each of these two civilizations has had on the world is 
particularly great. Greek civilization nurtured the Western legal culture, and 
Chinese civilization gave rise to the legal culture of East Asia. 
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2.1 Greek Civilization and Law as an Autonomous 
Institution 
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the ancient Greeks was the 
vesting of power in the individual. It is observed that ordinary Greek people 
developed a sense of personal agency that had no counterpart among the other 
ancient civilizations (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan, 2001:292). Indeed, 
one definition of happiness for the Greeks was ‘the exercise of vital powers 
along lines of excellence in a life affording them scope’ (Hamilton, 1973:25). 
Though the Greeks believed that the secular order was influenced by the gods, 
‘divine intervention and independent human action’ were seen to work together 
(Knox, 1990:39). The daily lives of the Greeks were imbued with a sense of 
choice and an absence of social constraint that were unparalleled in the ancient 
world. According to Hamilton, ‘The idea of the Athenian state was a union of 
individuals free to develop their own powers and live in their own way, 
obedient only to the laws they passed themselves and could criticize and change 
at will’ (1973:144). As Wieacker (1981:263) showed, in the developed Greek polis, 
‘law’ was not conceived of as a divine gift or an immemorial custom, but rather 
as a man-made, autonomous institution. 
 
Related to the Greek sense of personal freedom was the tradition of debate, 
which was already well established by at least the time of Homer in the 8th 
century (Galtung, 1981; Lloyd, 1990). Homer emphasizes repeatedly that, next to 
being a capable warrior, the most important skill for a man to have was that of a 
debater. Even ordinary people participated in the debates of the political 
assembly and could challenge even a king (Cromer, 1993:65). 
 
An aspect of Greek civilization that had a great effect on posterity was their 
sense of curiosity about the world and the presumption that it could be 
understood by the discovery of rules (Lloyd, 1991; Toulmin and Goodfield, 
1961:62). The Greeks focused on salient objects and used rules and categorization 
for purposes of describing and explaining the environment (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, 
and Norenzayan, 2001:292). In particular, recognition that the law was man-
made led the Greeks to question the moral basis of human laws. This at the same 
time raised the problem of why laws are binding. How can law bind the 
conscience of an individual? Wherein lies the ethical foundation of the coercive 
power of the state’s legal and moral order? For, if an eternal, immutable law 
obliges men to obey a particular secular law, there must exist behind the popular 
images of tribal deities ‘an eternal, all-wise lawgiver who has the power to bind 
and to loose’ (Rommen and Hanley, 1947:4-5). In fact, the Greeks speculated a 
great deal about the philosophical conception of natural law and about the law’s 
place in society. 
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Although the Greeks never developed an autonomous legal science6, their 
refinement of the concept of law and its philosophy and rhetoric were 
instrumental in the formation of Roman jurisprudence. The Romans did not give 
much attention to the theory of law; their philosophy was largely borrowed 
from the Greeks. Nevertheless, the detailed rules of Roman law were developed 
by professional jurists and became highly sophisticated. Specifically, the very 
technical superiority of the reasoning behind Roman laws developed through 
the categorizing of legal practices and generating of rules about them for the 
purpose of systematic explanation (Wieacker, 1981:268). Eventually, Roman 
jurisprudence reached its height in Justinian’s Code, which absorbed all the 
extracts from the writings of the greatest jurists. The large amount of material 
summarized in the term ‘Roman law’, according to Wieacker (1981: 257), 
provided the basis for the rational character of the Western legal systems and the 
legalism of the Western world. 
 
2.2 Chinese Civilization and Law as an Instrument for 
Maintaining Social Order 
 
This picture of the Greeks provides a basis with which to contrast the ancient 
Chinese. The Chinese counterpart to the Greek sense of personal agency was a 
sense of reciprocal social obligation or collective agency. According to Hansen 
(1983: 30), a fundamental intellectual difference between the Chinese and the 
Greeks was that the Chinese held the view that ‘the world is a collection of 
overlapping and interpenetrating stuffs or substances…[This contrasts] with the 
traditional Platonic philosophical picture of objects which are understood as 
individuals or particulars which instantiate or “have” properties’. The profound 
difference in metaphysics had many ramifications, for instance, the Chinese, 
unlike the Greeks, were inclined to feel that individuals are part of a closely-knit 
collectivity and that the behaviour of the individual should be guided by the 
expectations of the relationships in the community (Hamilton, 1984:408; Nisbett, 
Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan, 2001). 
 
These different metaphysical beliefs also resulted in great differences 
between Greece and China in their approach to philosophical questions. It has 
been argued that the Chinese tended to engage in context-dependent and holistic 
perceptual processes by attending to the relationship between the object and the 
context in which the object is located (Nisbett and Miyamoto, 2005). 
Confucianism, which is the dominant Chinese philosophy, is a prime example of 
this holistic approach. Notably, one fundamental goal of Confucianism is to 
                                                             
6 The positive laws of the various Greek states were not highly developed in the 
sense that Greeks did not have a class of legal professionals or state officials who 
monopolized the production of law or the delivery of legal services (Tamanaha, 
2004:7; Lesaffer and Arriens, 2009:77). 
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achieve a harmonious social order in which each person is able to realize his or 
her full potential as a human being through mutually beneficial relations with 
others (Peerenboom, 2002:28). Emphasizing the individual’s self-consciousness 
to maintain the social order, Confucians believed that the codification and public 
dissemination of laws sends the wrong kind of message (Peerenboom, 2002; 
Windrow, 2006). In Confucius’ words, ‘lead the people with government 
regulations and organize them with penal law (xing, 刑), and they will avoid 
punishments but will be without shame. Lead them with virtue and organize 
them through the li (礼 ), and the people will have a sense of shame and 
moreover will become humane people of good character’ (Analects, 2: 3). 
Theoretically, the early Confucian view leaves little room for the operation of 
codified law and punishment. 
 
Since li have often been construed as universal ethical principles, they have 
been depicted as kinds of natural law. However, as Peerenboom (2002: 31) 
explained, ‘the li are better understood as customary norms that gain favour 
within a particular historical tradition at a particular time’. Indeed, since there is 
an emphasis on change in Confucian philosophy, li were merely historically 
contingent norms founded on experience-based knowledge. It has been 
maintained that the Chinese never developed a concept corresponding to 
‘natural law’ for the sufficient reason that they did not have a concept of ‘nature’ 
as distinct from human or spiritual entities (Munro, 1969; Fung, 1983; Zhou, 1990; 
Lloyd, 1991). 
 
Notably, although early Confucian ethics evidence poor opinions of law, they 
were rivalled from the very beginning. Legalism (fajia, 法家) that had arisen 
during the early Warring State period (475-221 B.C.) advocated a social control 
program, which was in direct conflict with Confucian ideals. In the legalistic 
view, human beings are naturally greedy and selfish. Thus, virtue cultivation 
and moral examples are inadequate to maintain the social order because 
people’s base instincts will constantly drive them to wrongful behaviour (Ren, 
1997). The only way to make people behave correctly and to achieve a well-
ordered society is by an impartial system of rewards and punishments. 
Specifically, legalists advocate centralization of a ruler’s authority through 
creation of a vast bureaucracy and extensively written laws, and the use of 
harsh, universally enforced penal code to ensure compliance with state policy. 
They believe that if even minor infractions are ruthlessly punished, then no one 
will dare to commit serious crimes (Shang Jun Shu, 17:3). It is seen clearly that 
legalistic law is one of the means to serve the interest of the ruler, not necessarily 
the common people. Additionally, legalistic ideas can hardly be regarded as a 
result of scientific theory and the use of formal logic. Instead, they are reflective 
of the Chinese genius for practicality. 
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3 The Evolution of Criminal Interrogation Rules in 
Europe 
3.1 The Development of the Ideas of Natural law, the 
Rule of Law, and Legal Rational Domination in 
Medieval Europe 
During the fifth century, the Western Roman Empire gradually disintegrated 
in the face of continuous pressure from Germanic tribes. As Roman authority 
disintegrated, from the sixth until the eleventh century, Europe entered an age of 
decline and disruption: the Dark Middle Ages. Culturally speaking, the 
Germanic conquerors of the Roman Empire lagged behind the Romans. In 
Lesaffer and Arriens’s (2009: 123) words, ‘[the Germans] proved incapable of 
maintaining Roman civilization or of replacing it with anything worthy of the 
name’. The law that prevailed in the early kingdoms was essentially the 
Germanic custom of the rulers. 7  Although the Germans had retained the 
enactment of the Byzantine emperors together with some epitomes of 
elementary legal literature, these collections reflected a low level of legal science 
compared to the scope and complexities of the Justinian’s complication 
(Wieacker, 1981:273-274). Moreover, the Roman texts often proved to be beyond 
the comprehension of those who consulted them. 
 
The disappearance of Roman law accompanied the withering away of legal 
education and professional jurists who handed down judicial opinions by 
scientific reasoning. In place of the imperial system of courts were tribal 
assemblies in which the freemen of a given tribe sought to forestall interfamily 
vendettas and, more importantly, to facilitate negotiation and mediation 
between hostile families (Berman, 1983). During trials, customary rules were not 
applied rigidly. Rather, the tribal leaders would generally seek to persuade the 
parties to resolve a dispute amicably and reach a compromise (Stein, 1999:38). 
When the parties could not be reconciled, the community courts decided on a 
method of proof, often leaving vital points to be established by the ‘judgment of 
God’. Such judgment was ascertained by ordeals, duels, or the procurement of 
oath-helpers (Baldwin, 1961; Brown, 1975). All these forms of inquisition for 
guilt imply a low level of intellectual development. As Berman (1983: 77-78) 
rightly demonstrated, in settling criminal disputes, guilt was not determined by 
                                                             
7 During that time, Europe consisted of a multiplicity of tribal, local and lordship 
units, which came to share a common religious faith and common military loyalty to 
the emperor and kings. Nevertheless, prior to the eleventh century, royal and 
ecclesiastical authorities did not attempt to alter in any fundamental way the 
essential tribal and feudal character of the legal orders of Europe (Berman, 1983:51-
52). Thus legal orders prevailing among the peoples of the Continent during that 
period were primarily tribal in nature. 
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applying legal rules; rather, people’s superstitious beliefs and unconscious ideas 
influenced judgments. 
 
Nevertheless, the turning point came during the decades before and after the 
eleventh century. In fact, with the Christian Church emerging as an independent 
political entity under the papacy, a higher view of the law was established in 
Western Christendom. According to Christianity, there exists a universal 
ecumenical law above local traditions and enactments (Wieacker, 1990:12). 
Notably, while Greek thought was largely lost under the rule of the Germanic 
West during the Middle Ages, the concept of natural law found its way into early 
medieval theology. The fathers of the early Church made use of Stoic natural 
law to support the Christian doctrine of the personal Creator-God as the author 
of the eternal law as well as of the natural moral law promulgated in the voice of 
conscience and reason (Rommen and Hanley, 1947:35). The Church Fathers 
Origen (181-254), Augustine (354-430), and Isidore of Seville (560-636) further 
claimed that all secular law, including the canon law of the Church, should be in 
accordance with natural or divine law to be valid (Lesaffer and Arriens, 
2009:183). Nonetheless, a new philosophy and a new world order did not follow 
at once upon the entrance of the Christian faith into the Germanic world; prior to 
the late eleventh century, Christianity was for the most part an otherworldly 
faith (Rommen and Hanley, 1947:30). The Papal Revolution, however, made 
Christianity into a political and legal program. Christianity became the 
prevailing religious ideology. Accordingly, law came to be seen as the very 
essence of faith and as a way of fulfilling Western Christendom’s mission to 
achieve the kingdom of God on earth (Berman, 1983:521). 
 
The religious cloak over understandings of law and society in medieval times 
in fact laid the groundwork for the concept of the rule of law in the West. 
According to this concept, rulers should be subject to divine law and the positive 
law, which they themselves lawfully enacted. To be sure, with the Gregorian 
Reform, religious faith became individualized and privatized. The emphasis of 
Christianity shifted from collective salvation to the salvation of each individual 
soul, and from the Last Judgment of mankind as a whole at the end of times to 
individual judgment upon each person’s death (Lesaffer and Arriens, 2009; Finer, 
1999:24). Hence, under the new theology, the individual could participate in the 
worship with his own inalienable tie to God. Under this understanding, the ruler 
had no superior status. He was one with his fellow-believers in having to obey 
divine law (Finer, 1999:25-26). Consequently, believers had the right and duty to 
disobey the divinely appointed ruler when he violated fundamental law. This, as 
discussed above, was based on the belief that fundamental law was itself 
divinely instituted. Popes and kings made laws, but they did so as deputies of 
God, acknowledging that not they but ‘God is the source of all law’ (Berman, 
1983; Tamanaha, 2004:23). In this sense, for the first time in Western history, 
‘law’ provided the ideology and social cohesion for rebellion and reform 
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movements at the same time as it served to legitimate and reinforce the social 
order. 
 
The concept of the rule of law or impersonalized obedience to law was 
supported by a high level of legal consciousness and legal sophistication that 
came to prevail throughout Europe in the late Middle Ages. As Hamilton (1984: 
410) noted, the tension regarding personal power between position holders and 
non-position holders, or between kings and people, favoured the development 
of a systematic means of defining jurisdictions within which the right of 
command is deemed legitimate. This increasingly became the function of law. 
Therefore, as a principle of domination applied in practice, the theme of 
personalized authority became the object of codification in institutionalizing the 
legal and economic idea of property, as well as political and philosophic ideas of 
freedom and reason (Hamilton, 1990:96). Of course, the law of the Middle Ages 
did not embrace norms and rights identical to those of the twenty-first century. 
Nevertheless, this does not undercut the conclusion that the medieval canonists 
and jurists understood and endorsed the notion that natural rights existed and 
could be asserted by individuals (Tierney, 1997; Helmholz, 2002:303-304). Law 
factually provided the formal means that allowed both kings and people to 
preserve personal spheres of power. According to Weber (1968), it is this 
legalism or legal rational domination that most distinguishes European 
civilization from that of other high cultures, such as China’s, in which law 
emanates from an accepted social ethic rather than the logic of authority. 
 
Notably, in the general context of a movement towards more rational legal 
procedure, the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 abolished the old system of trials 
by ordeal. The attempt to make God the fact finder for human disputes was thus 
abandoned (Baldwin, 1961:613). Since mortal judges were going to replace God 
in finding and deciding guilt or innocence, it was well understood that the 
preservation of legality required not merely abstract perceptions of justice and 
equality but also specific principles and rules. Hence, the theme of legalism led 
to the systematization of jurisprudence and to a legal framework regulating the 
‘free’ will of legal officials in truth-finding processes (Posner, 1990:6-7). As 
Wieacker (1990: 9-19) argued, from successive re-shapings of the sources of 
jurisprudence, there arose what moderns recognize as European legal 
civilization. More specifically, the history of the European legal civilization and 
interrogation jurisprudence can be divided roughly into two main stages, each 
of them captured by its own distinctive formulation of the legal science. 
 
3.2 Late Middle Ages and Early Modern Age: Divine 
Law and the Obligation to Answer 
In the late Middle Ages, secular law and jurisprudence were largely based 
upon the tenets of natural and divine law, laws that God himself had created 
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and implanted in authoritative texts. For medieval jurists, all Greek, Roman and 
early Christian writings, especially the newly discovered Roman law of Justinian 
and canon law,8  shared to some extent the authority of the Bible (Berman, 
1983:122; Lesaffer and Arriens, 2009: 253-254). These authoritative materials 
were treated by the jurists as data to be observed, classified, and systematically 
explained in terms of concepts of truth and general principles (maxims) (Stein, 
1999). Several maxims of the ius commune 9  expressed the most important 
limitation on the judge’s power to convict. These maxims preserved the 
medieval view that human testimony was a form of proof whose probative 
value could not be weighed (Jackson, 1988:552). Under this rationale, only two 
forms of evidence could provide proof ‘as clear as the noonday sun’: non-
contradictory testimony from two eyewitnesses, or confession by the accused 
(Langbein, 1977). This meant convictions of crimes could be pronounced only 
based on the testimony of two eyewitnesses or the confession of the accused. All 
other forms of circumstantial evidence, known as indicia, were hierarchically 
arranged and assigned numerical values. With only one eyewitness and several 
indicia there could be no conviction (Peters, 1985:69). Moreover, the ius commune 
insisted that a judge adhere strictly to the rules of law and acquit a suspect if the 
proof were imperfect: ‘the judge must decide according to the allegations and 
the laws, not according to his conscience’ (Fraher, 1989:24). 
 
Nevertheless, the rules of evidence in the ius commune were largely 
aspirational—a set of norms that look good on paper but were not enforced, 
because the required witnesses were seldom available, and, in the view of the 
draconian punishments, voluntary confessions were also in short supply. Since 
covert crimes do not generate eyewitness testimony, and since no amount of 
circumstantial evidence could substitute for the testimony, Langbein (1977: 5-8) 
argued that medieval civil and canon legal systems turned to torture in order to 
satisfy the alternative requirement of confession. Consequently, from the 
inception of the inquisitorial procedure, the examination of the suspect was 
considered the principal mechanism for discovering truth (Damaska, 1978:875). 
According to the Roman-canon procedure,10 a judge was allowed to put a direct 
question to a suspect regarding his guilt whenever (1) the suspect was under 
infamy for the crime, that is, when he was publicly known to have committed 
the crime; or (2) when there was clear circumstantial evidence; or (3) when the 
                                                             
8  Originally, canon law lacked an authoritative body of texts comparable to 
Justinian’s corpus. Nevertheless, by the 1160s, the civil lawyers recognized canon law 
as a discipline parallel to civil law, with parity of esteem (Stein, 1999:49) 
9 The term ius commune refers to the combination of Roman and canon law that 
dominated European legal education before the modern era. In large measure, it also 
determined the rules of practice in the courts of the Latin West (Helmholz, 1997). 
10  As Langbein (1974: 129) shows, by the sixteenth century, Roman-canon 
inquisitorial procedure was visible nearly everywhere one would think to look on 
the European continent: Spain, Italy, Sweden, German Empire, France, and the 
Spanish Netherlands. 
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testimony of one immediate witness could be brought forth against the suspect. 
If any of these three conditions were fulfilled, the judge could question the 
suspect concerning his crime, and he was legally bound to answer truthfully and 
unambiguously (Connery, 1955:181; Langbein, 2004:95). The violation of these 
legal duties (silence) constituted one of the indicia required for the interlocutory 
order to apply torture (Damaska, 1978:875). Moreover, when the evidence 
strongly tended to establish the suspect’s guilt but the suspect still refused to 
confess, torture would be applied to induce a confession (Langbein, 1977:2004). 
 
Although the system of judicial torture was never known in England,11 there 
had been a broad consensus among European jurists that it was legitimate to 
require a particular person to answer incriminating questions, when there was 
good reason for suspecting that person had violated the law. As Macnair (1990: 
67) stated, up until at least the revolution of 1688, the common lawyers shared 
the same ‘mental universe’ of the canonists on the question of self-incrimination. 
Indeed, whereas English common lawyers used the Nemo tenetur prodere seipsum 
(no person is to be compelled to accuse himself) maxim12 to rein in the activities 
of the Court of High Commission or the Star Chamber, they were not seeking to 
establish an invariable rule of practice or ‘procedures indispensable to fair trial 
or due process of law’ (Levy, 1968:321). Had this been their aim, they would 
have applied the rule to unsworn statements made in their own courts, or at least 
they would have argued that it should be applied there. The fact is, they did not 
even make the connection. In practice, the accused was legally obliged to 
formulate a factual defence and, at the same time, to counter the prosecution’s 
factual evidence as it unfolded. Even when the accused was provided with 
defence counsel around the middle of the eighteenth century, the counsel’s role 
was strictly limited to advice on legal issues, never on factual matters (Beattie, 
1991). The underlying assumption was that innocent defendants could easily 
persuade the jury of their innocence. In contrast, guilty defendants would betray 
themselves to the jury through speech, gesture, demeanour, and manner 
(Langbein, 1994:1053). Accordingly, seventeenth and eighteenth century English 
courts frequently drew adverse inferences from the accused’s tactical use of 
                                                             
11 According to Langbein (2004: 99), whereas the Europeans had turned to Roman-
canon law of proof in order to legitimate a system of adjudication by professional 
judges, in England, the ordeals were replaced by trial jury which was assembled 
from men living near the scene of the crime. Given the fact that the English accepted 
‘the rough verdict of the countryside, without caring to investigate the logical 
process’ (Pollock and Maitland, 1898, 660-661), the use of abusive interrogation 
practices to obtain confessions was indeed much less prevalent in England than it 
was on the Continent. 
12 The recent Helmholz-Macnair canon law theory suggests that the maxim Nemo 
tenetur prodere seipsum originated within the ius commune as a defensive sub-principle 
of inquisitorial procedure centuries before its appearance within the common law. 
The idea was taken up by seventeenth century common lawyers and expanded into 
the modern format (Helmholz, 1990:967; Macnair, 1990:70). 
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silence, seeing it either as directly or indirectly inferring guilt in order to build a 
prima facie case (Theophilopoulos, 2003:162). 
 
3.3 Morden Age: Individual Autonomy and the Right 
to Remain Silent 
The turning point of European legal civilization came in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries with the emergence of the theories of Copernicus (1473-
1543), Kepler (1571-1630), Galileo (1564-1642), and Newton (1642-1727) about the 
nature of the physical world. These new theories reduced the earth to a mere 
part in the universe, a planet occupying an immense space, and suggested that 
individuals could make their own inquiries into the nature of the world. This 
view came to be reflected in the writings of philosophers as diverse as Descartes 
(1596-1650), Spinoza (1632-1677), Leibniz (1646-1716), Rousseau (1712-1778), 
Bacon (1561-1626), and Locke (1632-1704). Whatever their differences, these 
philosophers all came to agree that knowledge may be gained by anyone 
working on his own, rather than by appeal to authoritative propositions (Jackson, 
1988), a doctrine that has been called the ‘principle of universal cognitive 
competence’ (Cohen, 1983:1). It actually took some time for European procedure, 
which had been strictly based on ius commune, to adopt the spirit of universal 
cognitive competence. By the eighteenth century, a number of writers imbued 
with Enlightenment thought began to mount a collective attack on the whole 
system of legal proofs. Beccaria, for instance, developed as a replacement for the 
system of legal proofs a system of moral proofs by which the weight of evidence 
was to be assessed not by the sheer number of proofs but by the number of 
independent items of evidence that could be obtained (Esmein, Mittermaier, and 
Garraud, 2010:364). However, the procedural reforms did not begin until 1808, 
when the great Napoleonic Code d’instruction criminelle caused the biggest shake-
up of European criminal justice machinery since the decision of the Fourth 
Lateran Council of 1215 to abandon the old system of trials by ordeal 13 
(Summers, 2007). 
 
The key features of the reformed European procedure as it first emerged in 
France and later in other European countries was the abolition of the system of 
legal proofs and the establishment of the doctrine that the accused cannot 
lawfully be required to answer incriminating questions or confess during 
interrogation. More precisely, on the Continent, the examining magistrate, and 
trial judge were no longer fettered by the doctrine of ‘two eyewitnesses or 
confession’. Instead, they were free to conduct an active investigation of the 
                                                             
13 The 1808 Code provided for the separation of the roles of the prosecutor and the 
investigating judge. As a result, out went the pure inquisitorial system whereby the 
same authority, an examining judge, was responsible for prosecuting, examining, 
and judging and in came a separation of the roles of judging and prosecuting 
(Summers, 2007:34-35). 
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truth and evaluate the evidence according to their convictions (Jackson, 1988, 
553-555). Similarly, across the channel in England, the rather vague and shifting 
standard of proof was replaced by a new ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard by 
the late eighteenth century (McCormick, 1954). The idea that the accused was to 
be regarded as innocent until sufficient evidence proved otherwise gained 
momentum. Given that evidence introduced at a trial was subject to the free 
evaluation of the judge or jury, it became clear that confessions obtained by the 
threat or use of physical and psychological force were not voluntary and tended 
to be unreliable (Pieck, 1962). Meanwhile, in the wake of the Enlightenment and 
the French Revolution, there was increasing consensus, both in England and on 
the Continent, that the government should not be permitted to employ certain 
kinds of coercive pressure against any individual, regardless of the individual’s 
guilt or innocence (White, 2001:2-3). Consequently, animated by both scepticism 
as to a coerced statement’s reliability and concern for protecting individual 
dignity, European courts eventually prohibited the use of coercion and 
inhumane practices, including compulsion by legal mandate, 14  to force an 
accused person to answer questions in the criminal process (Esmein, Mittermaier, 
and Garraud, 2010). 
 
Despite Europeans’ general recognition of the right of the accused to remain 
silent and its rule against the use of coercion to compel a person to answer 
incriminating questions during criminal proceedings, there was less agreement 
among the states regarding how far, short of the forgoing coercive devices, 
authorities could go to persuade or encourage the accused to speak, either 
during pre-trial questioning or during the trial. In fact, as the respublica christiana 
in Europe collapsed in the sixteenth century, law as the product of a sovereign 
legislator gradually replaced the medieval and early-modern notion of the ruler 
as the administrator of law, based on the conception of law as principally a 
matter of universal reason (Nelken and Feest, 2001:104). Therefore, one can 
discern a great emphasis in the English common-law system on respecting an 
accused’s autonomous right to decide whether and how to participate in 
defending himself, while the Continental civilian systems put greater emphasis 
on a more ‘social’ approach which obliges states to take positive action to protect 
the rights of the accused (Trechsel and Summers, 2005:263-264). This difference 
in approach would seem to be reflected in the different political ideologies 
underpinning the two systems—classical laissez faire versus amore paternalist 
approach (Damaska, 2005). Thus, the English system has tended to put a high 
premium on the accused’s autonomous decision to admit, deny, or refuse to 
answer in the face of potentially incriminating questioning. Under British law, 
police are required to warn a person of his or her right to silence and to counsel 
prior to interrogation when there are reasonable grounds to suspect the person 
                                                             
14 As a general rule, suspects are not prosecuted for refusing to answer questions 
before trial and are never prosecuted for contempt for failing to testify at trial 
(Jackson, 2009). 
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of an offense, 15  again upon arrest, 16  and, finally, when a detained person is 
charged or informed that he or she may be prosecuted for an offense.17 Once a 
suspect requests legal advice, the police cannot continue to question him until he 
has consulted with a solicitor,18 and the suspect must be allowed to have the 
solicitor present whenever he is interviewed if the solicitor is available. 19 
Damaska (1973: 587) observed, ‘The Anglo-American adversary system’s 
commitment to values rather than the pursuit of truth has caused it to erect 
higher evidentiary barriers than its Continental non-adversary counterpart’. In 
contrast, Continental civilian systems have given less opportunity to accused 
persons to exercise choice over the course of procedural actions, because there is 
a general understanding in civilian systems that rules implementing the right to 
silence should not present substantial barriers to testimonial evidence from the 
accused (Van Kessel, 1998:842). This perspective is reflected in the limited right 
to counsel during initial periods of police interrogation and in the ‘permissive 
approach’ to waiver rules that allow continued questioning in the face of 
assertions of silence or expressions of a desire for counsel (Van Kessel, 1998; Ma, 
2007). Not surprisingly, the reality in most Continental jurisdictions is that most 
suspects do speak or testify during pre-trial questioning by the police or the 
investigating magistrate (Jackson, 2009:848). 
 
Some see in this difference of approach a fundamental dichotomy between 
English common-law and Continental civil-law systems. It may be better, 
however, to view it in terms of competing tendencies within common-law and 
civil law systems, one emphasizing individual autonomy, and the other, 
accurate outcomes. To take two examples, despite the traditional emphasis in 
inquisitorial systems on the importance of truth-finding, Continental countries 
have seen a growth in administering warnings to suspects about their right to 
remain silent prior to interrogation and the use of an exclusionary rule to ensure 
police compliance with the warning requirement 20  (Ma, 2007). However, a 
                                                             
15 The Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and Questioning of Persons by 
Police Officers (Code C), § 10.1. 
16 Ibid. § 10.3. 
17 Ibid. §16.2. 
18 Ibid. § 6.6. 
19 Ibid. § 6.8. 
20 Notably, forty-five years ago, when the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966) held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applied to 
the pretrial interrogation of suspects in custody, few European countries required the 
police to issue preinterrogation warnings. Except for coerced confessions, it was also 
rare for European courts to exclude evidence for police failure to follow procedure 
rules (Ma, 2007, 6). The U.S. Court then seemed to lead the way in expanding the 
procedural safeguards for suspects subject to police inquiry. Nevertheless, in the 
post-Miranda cases, to accommodate the conflicting interests between law 
enforcement and individual interests in police interrogation cases, the U.S. Court has 
carved various exceptions out of Miranda exclusion policy, for instance, the public 
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counter-tendency in English common-law jurisdiction is seen in the shift from 
giving more procedural safeguards in police questioning and thus away from an 
emphasis on respect for autonomy. The modification to British law in 1994 that 
curtails the right to silence and permits the courts to draw adverse inferences 
from a suspect’s failure to answer police questions21 clearly exemplifies crime 
control concerns (O’Reilly, 1997). 
 
This gradual ‘convergence’ in the interrogation procedure of common and 
civil law systems in Europe is also because that there have been external 
pressures on states to adopt common procedural standards in police 
questioning. Since it came into force in 1953, the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) has served as a reflection of Europe’s effort toward the 
establishment of common standards of individual human rights and freedoms. 
The forty-seven countries that are currently signatories to the Convention are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), 
which was established in 1959 in Strasbourg as a mechanism to interpret and 
enforce the obligations created by the Convention. In addition, supranational 
institutions, such as the Council of Europe and the European Union22, provide a 
vehicle for strengthening cooperation within a framework of common 
procedural rights and guarantees laid down by the ECHR and, more recently, 
the EU Charter of Rights (Cape, Namoradze, Smith, and Spronken, 2010). 
 
In its interpretation of fair interrogation standards, the European Court of 
Human Rights has given weight to both autonomy rights and the notion of 
effective defence to achieve accurate outcomes in fact-finding. Although the 
Convention contains no explicit reference to the right to remain silent and the 
                                                                                                                                               
security exception, which permits the police to interrogate a suspect without the 
Miranda warning if there is evidence indicating that immediate interrogation is 
necessary for some urgent public need (Ma, 2007; Roth, 2008). 
21 According to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984), silence 
during police questioning should not lead to adverse comment by either the judge or 
the prosecution. In particular, the judge was not permitted to suggest to the jury that 
silence or a refusal to answer questions was in any way evidence of guilt (Zander, 
1990:144). However, a modification was made by the Criminal Justice and Public 
Order Act 1994 (CJPOA). 
22 Article 82 § 2 of the Lisbon Treaty provides for the establishment of minimum rules 
in respect of, inter alia, the rights of individuals in criminal procedure. Further, on 1 
July, 2009, the Swedish Presidency presented a Roadmap for Strengthening 
Procedural Rights of Suspected or Accused Persons in Criminal Proceedings. The 
Roadmap was incorporated into the Stockholm Programme for the period 2010—
2014, which was adopted by the European Council on 10/11 December, 2009. The 
Roadmap, which provides for a step-by-step approach, identifies six areas that future 
EU work should focus on. Specifically, Measure C of the Roadmap, which is mainly 
concerned with the right to a legal counsel at the earliest appropriate stage of 
criminal proceedings, is due to be legislated in 2011. 
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privilege against self-incrimination, the Court, drawing its rationale from Article 
6 of the Convention, has been steadily developing its distinctive vision of the 
right and privilege (Wu, 2011). The Court’s perspective suggests that, as a rule, 
access to a lawyer should be provided at the first interrogation of a suspect by 
the police. Somewhat akin to the Miranda rules23, when a suspect has invoked the 
right to be assisted by counsel during interrogation, the Court is of the opinion 
that the suspect should not be subject to further interrogation by the authorities 
until counsel has been made available to the suspect, unless the suspect himself 
initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police or 
prosecution24. In Salduz, the Court expressly linked the right of access not only to 
the need to protect the accused against abusive conduct on the part of the 
authorities and the prevention of miscarriages of justice but also to the fulfilment 
of the aims of Article 6, notably ‘equality of arms between the investigating or 
prosecuting authorities and the accused’25. Although, traditionally, the principle 
of equality of arms has been reserved for the trial, the realization that the 
examination of evidence does not always occur in court has become widespread 
(Summers, 2007:28). Moreover, the situation in the interrogation room is 
compounded by the fact that suspects normally want to provide an account of 
themselves (Jackson, 2009:850). In the Court’s view, the defence right to speak 
for oneself is a double-edged sword with the potential to count against the 
suspect. In Pishchalnikov, the Court reiterated that criminal law—substantive as 
well as procedural—and criminal proceedings are a rather complex and 
technical matter that is often incomprehensible to laypersons, including the 
suspect. 26  In the absence of assistance by counsel, who could provide legal 
advice and technical skills, the applicant is unable to make the correct 
assessment of the consequences the decision to provide an account or confess 
would have on the outcome of the criminal case.27 Importantly, practically at 
every stage of criminal proceedings, decisions have to be made, and the wrong 
                                                             
23 The Miranda Court established a general rule that once a suspect indicates that he 
or she does not wish to be interrogated, the police must cease all questioning (Van 
Kessel, 1998). With respect to whether the police may make attempts to obtain a 
waiver of the right to remain silent from a suspect, the U.S. Court in subsequent 
decisions made a distinction between the situation when a suspect asserts his or her 
right to remain silent and the situation when the right to counsel is invoked (Ma, 
2007). If a suspect asserts only the right to remain silent, the police may resume 
questioning after a substantial time lapse so long as they properly advise the suspect 
of the Miranda rights prior to interrogation (Michigan v. Mosley, 1975). But once a 
suspect has invoked the right to counsel under Miranda, there can be no further 
interrogation until counsel has been made available unless defendant initiates further 
communications with police officers (Edwards v. Arizona, 1981; Arizona v. Roberson, 
1988; Minnick v. Mississippi, 1990). 
24 ECtHR 24 December 2009, Pishchalnikov v. Russia, (no. 7025/04), § 79. 
25 ECtHR 27 November 2008, Salduz v. Turkey (no. 36391/02), § 53. 
26 ECtHR 24 December 2009, Pishchalnikov v. Russia (no. 7025/04), § 84. 
27 Ibid. § 85. 
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decision may cause irreparable damage. The Court then concluded that reliable 
knowledge of law and practice is usually required to assess the consequences of 
such decisions.28 A lawyer can not only ensure the legality of any measures taken 
in the course of the investigation proceedings; he can also provide advice and 
assistance on how to mount the most effective defence. For sure, various options 
are available at this stage as they are at the trial (Wu, 2011:54). As Jackson (2009: 
861) pointed out, ‘once the rights of the defence are put in place … the right of 
silence reverts to an exercise of will or choice on the part of the individual 
accused, but a choice that is made on an informed basis as part of a defence 
strategy which is taken in full recognition of the costs and benefits of its exercise’. 
 
4 The Evolution of Criminal Interrogation Rules 
in China 
The European case provides a particularly valuable contrast to the Chinese 
one. 
 
4.1 Legalistic Bureaucracy to Enforce Confucian 
Norms and Moral Domination in Imperial China 
The Zhou dynasty (1046-256 B.C.) maintained fairly effective control of China 
for a few generations, but then gradually lost its grip. After 770 B.C., real power 
was divided among a number of states. During the war period, the Qin State’s 
minister, Lord Shang (390-338 B.C.), overhauled the state according to legalistic 
ideas. His legalism-inspired reforms deployed a detailed penal code through an 
elaborate, tightly controlled bureaucracy to ensure efficient control in the hands 
of the ruler (Bary, 1995). These reforms, together with other favoured 
agricultural policies, successfully bolstered the state’s power. Finally, the Qin 
state unified China and established the Qin Empire (221-206 B.C.). Although the 
ruthless rule of the Qin led to the empire’s speedy downfall, the succeeding Han 
dynasty’s emperors, facing tremendous pressure to consolidate their rule in such 
a large territory, retained the Qin’s essentially legalist apparatus for central 
administration (Windrow, 2006). 
 
At that time, the Confucian intelligentsia also started to explore the 
relationship between Confucian li and legalist fa. In a similar thought shift, Dong 
Zongshu (179-104 B.C.), a Han Confucian, integrated the legalist and Yin-Yang 
school of thought to create his own Confucian doctrines. He overhauled the 
standard interpretation of the Confucian classics and advocated combining the 
functions of li and fa by emphasizing the supremacy of li and the subservience of 
fa. On the presumption of the operations of Yin (阴) and Yang (阳), he further 
                                                             
28 Ibid. § 84. 
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emphasized the emperor’s sacrosanct power in governing the state and in 
enacting laws. Simply put, this shift in Confucian thought legitimized the use of 
bureaucracy, recognized the role of law and punishment, and helped to uphold 
the superiority of the emperor (Ma, 1987). Eventually, Emperor Wu (157-87 B.C.) 
adopted Confucianism as the official orthodox doctrine. Confucian moral 
standards then began to become part of the content of law, and criminal code 
became the instrument for executing such content. Even after the Han dynasty’s 
fall in 220, successive dynasties continued to accelerate the Confucianization of 
the legal code. Perhaps most importantly, the Tang Code,29 first issued in 637 
and last revised in 737 during the Tang dynasty (618-907), represents the final 
synthesis of the legalist and Confucian ideals, which had begun to merge 
centuries before (Ma, 1987: 673). 
 
The ‘legalization of Confucianism’ process was further fostered by the 
internal bureaucratic shifts in imperial administrations. After the Han dynasty, 
the Chinese government began to operate through its bureaucracy, brimming 
with educated officials who had passed state examinations based on Confucian 
Classics. The Confucian concept of family was in fact extended to judicial and 
governmental affairs, where the district magistrate was called the ‘parent officer’ 
(fu-mu guan, 父母官) and evidenced presumably virtuous moral characteristics, 
such as benevolence, impartiality, and superior wisdom (Alford, 1984). As Ren 
(1997: 25) put it, ‘the government was not a public servant body, but a sacrosanct 
paternity’. Using persuasion rather than force, the Confucian ruler was 
supposed to inspire others to become humane and rule by virtue of his moral 
vision (Peerenboom, 2002:32-33). Scholar-bureaucrats formed the main ruling 
class of China up until the nineteenth century (Moise, 1994; Windrow, 2006). 
 
4.2 The Tang Code: Moral Persuasion, Confession, and 
Coercion 
As indicated, the Tang Code is characterized by Confucian moral standards 
(li) and its penal attribute (fa). The Code’s preamble states that the primary aim 
of the law is to maintain human order in coordination with the cosmic order of 
Heaven and Earth. In other words, the ruler’s remedial use of law serves to 
redress human disorders and restore the proper balance between man and 
nature. Hence, if a crime occurs, the truth has to be discerned so that the state 
can administer appropriate punishment30 and restore social harmony (Ren, 1997, 
31). Because of this assumption, determining factual guilt, which requires the 
                                                             
29 The Tang Code is the most influential legal work in imperial China. The Code 
served as the basis for all subsequent Chinese criminal and criminal procedure law 
until the foundation of the Republic of China in 1911, and some of its attributes can 
be seen even today(Ansley, 1986). 
30 Penalties in imperial China were designed to fit the criminal, not the crime (Ansley, 
1986:171). 
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offender’s admission of guilt and repentance of the crime, is almost 
indispensable for concluding criminal cases before the courts (Tang Code, Art. 
476). Therefore, undergirding the interrogation procedure of the Tang trial was a 
set of rules whose purpose was to persuade or oblige the accused to respond or 
confess to the charges against him. 
 
4.2.1 Confession by Persuasion 
The questioning of accused criminals in imperial Chinese courtrooms was 
designed to teach, humble, and extract contrition from wrongdoers. The 
structure of Chinese trial inquiries can be described as ‘paternalistic’31 when 
historical sources allow one to see how an imperial trial was conducted. In 
general, a criminal case was first investigated, then prosecuted, and tried by a 
district magistrate who was both the judge and chief administrator of the region. 
At trial, both the accused and the accuser were required to kneel on the ground 
in front of the magistrate who was assigned the responsibility of ferreting out 
the truth (Gelatt, 1982:264-265). As an authority in a leading position, the 
magistrate could control and extend the questioning sequences, as he deems 
necessary to extract the desired response (Chang, 2004). In contrast, suspects 
were required to respond interactively to the questions asked. Though the 
frequent, instinctive desire of the guilty to play innocent was recognized, the 
Tang trial was not concerned with exposing the magistrate to the suspect’s 
dubious statements. On the contrary, the Code provided that the magistrate 
should sit back at the beginning of the case and expect that evidence damaging 
to the suspect would come out of his altercation with the accuser and witnesses 
(Art. 476). It was believed that precious information could be obtained even 
from false denials of guilt, inconsistencies, and other verbal and non-verbal 
expressions emanating from the suspect (Zu, 2008). The Code went on to specify 
that both the accused and the accuser’s statements should be verified to the 
extent feasible (Art. 476).32 Eventually, if the suspect managed to prove to the 
magistrate’s satisfaction during the course of the interrogation that he was 
innocent and had been falsely accused, one way to maintain proper social 
                                                             
31 Chinese patriarchy fundamentally differs from that found in the West. Jamieson 
(1921: 4) noted that there is no Chinese concept equivalent to patria potestas; in 
Chinese the relevant concept identifying patriarchy is xiao (孝). More specifically, 
Patria potestas defines jurisdictions within which a person can exercise personal 
discretion, and accordingly defines relations of authority between people. Xiao 
defines roles, actions and values that accompany the roles, and, accordingly, a 
person’s duty to a role. These two concepts imply different ideas about the nature of 
patriarchal domination both within and especially beyond the family (Hamilton, 
1984:411). 
32 Thus, for example, if a suspect confessed to a murder, he should have been asked 
where he put the weapon. If he said he threw it into the river, the magistrate was 
supposed to send someone to find it, so that once fetched, it could corroborate the 
confession. 
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harmony was to punish the accuser for the crime of false accusation (Bodde and 
Morris, 1967:402-408). If the suspicions were confirmed, the suspect would be 
greatly shamed and criticized to persuade the ‘offender’ to change his mind, 
repent, and admit to the facts of the crime (Ren, 1997; Chang, 2004). Chinese 
literature, arts, and folklore often portray the magistrate as talking loudly, 
powerfully, and fiercely to urge the reluctant suspect to confess (Wu and Vander 
Beken, 2012). 
 
4.2.2 Confession by Judicial Torture 
Judicial torture, at least in theory, was reserved as a last resort for those who 
were under strong suspicion, but continued to defy confession of their moral 
faults (Tang Code, Art. 476). It had been long recognized by Chinese lawmakers 
that the agony of torture might induce the innocent to confess things that they 
never did (Zu, 2008). Hence, a highly detailed set of rules governing the 
application of torture was put forward by the Code to enhance the reliability of 
tortured confessions and acquit the innocent. First, torture practices were 
permitted only in cases where evidence strongly supported the suspect’s guilt. 
As observed earlier, Article 476 of the Code laid down specific procedures 
regarding interrogation, such as the confrontation between the accused and the 
accuser and the co-examination of objective evidence. By and large, magistrates 
were not vested with discretionary powers; rather, they were required to strictly 
enforce the statutory rules (Alford, 1984; MacCormack, 1987). Hence, violations 
of these rules by magistrates carried a punishment of sixty strokes with a 
wooden stick (Tang Code, Art. 476). Second, magistrates needed prior approval 
from higher officials if they decided to employ torture (Tang Code, Art. 476). 
Third, the types of torture were limited to whipping or beating with a bamboo 
strip or wooden stick, and adjusted depending on the suspect’s responses during 
the examination. The Code provided that torture should not exceed three 
applications with intervals of 20 days between them; the number of whippings 
or beatings should not exceed 200 in total. If the suspect refused to confess even 
after these beatings, he should be released subject to obtaining a guarantor 
pending the trial (Tang Code, Art. 477). Presumably, 20 days was considered a 
reasonable period for individuals to ‘reflect on’ their acts and choose to repent or 
confess. This can be seen as another example of lawmakers’ intent to deter 
undesirable social behaviour and change the wrongdoer’s mind. 
 
4.2.3 Factual Guilt, Shaming and Obligations of Roles 
All this clearly implies that the essential purpose of the criminal interrogation 
at the Tang trial was not determining legal guilt of a crime by using legally 
admissible statements against the accused, but, rather, discovering factual guilt 
through the offender’s confession and through making the wrongdoer morally 
shameful and remorseful. Judicial torture, which, together with the confession 
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reward policy, 33  was lenient to those who complied with the government, 
fortified the wrongdoer’s deference to legal authority. 
 
Moreover, power restriction in the imperial Chinese courtroom apparently 
was not found in the allocation of rights and duties through a system of general 
norms, as in the West, but in the maintaining of the proper relationships among 
those who held different ‘roles’. In medieval Europe, as discussed earlier, each 
individual seeks his own salvation, in a secular as well as a religious sense. As a 
result, Western law preserved the personal sphere by institutionalizing rights 
and obligations of individuals. In contrast, the Chinese, with no transcendental 
sources of legitimation and under the strong influence of Confucian thought, 
built their legal system on assumptions of harmony among hierarchically 
arranged players. Individuality was defined in terms of one’s responsibility to 
explicitly defined roles. More specifically, the suspect, as a subordinate member 
of the family, had the obligation to be obedient and admit his moral guilt. The 
judge or magistrate, as the head of a family, had the authority and obligation to 
persuade the suspect to change his mind and confess based on evidence and 
patience. Hence, in theory, power is impersonal, non-intentional, and directed 
towards maintaining the harmony of the whole. It is actually the duty of all 
individuals to conform to their roles in order to maintain social harmony. 
Accordingly, ‘giving each his due’ is not emphasized in the Chinese legal culture. 
 
4.3 A Stable Interrogation Model for Centuries 
Through the interplay between Confucian moral standards and legalistic 
bureaucracy, the ‘persuasive’ interrogation model of the Tang Code proved 
astoundingly stable by thriving until the early twentieth century. 
 
On the one hand, rather than simply enforcing an arbitrary set of 
government-defined criminal procedures, the interrogation rules noticeably 
reflected social norms which were already pervasive, providing legal 
enforcement with powerful social legitimacy. In fact, after Confucianism became 
the official orthodox doctrine in China, families who were affluent enough to 
practice it engaged private tutors to teach their children Confucianism. 
Schoolboys were required to learn the entire Analects by heart (Grant, 1989). 
Among poor families, Confucianism was passed on by parents or other adults 
from generation to generation (Jiang, Lambert, and Wang, 2007). Therefore, 
there is good reason to believe that Confucian moral standards, particularly 
those dealing with contrition, patriarchal relationships and familial obligations, 
were to some extent internalized within Chinese citizens. Meanwhile, as 
observed earlier, Confucian doctrines have, since the Han dynasty, served as the 
                                                             
33 The Tang Code provided detailed statutory clarifications of penalty reduction or 
remission for offenders who confessed or surrendered voluntarily according to the 
seriousness of their offences (Rickett, 1971; Ren, 1997).  
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guiding light to define what might or might not become a matter of law and 
govern the administration of criminal penalties. The consensus between law and 
morality often indicates that what the state seeks to enforce by compulsion 
corresponds largely to the sense of right and wrong of the society in general 
(Ren, 1997). In the West, as Connery (1955: 181) revealed, moralists maintain that 
no criminal is obligated to spontaneously reveal his crime to the public 
authorities. This would be expecting too much of human nature. In contrast, the 
Confucian Chinese regarded admitting one’s misconduct in public and desiring 
to change oneself as valuable virtues (Lu and Miethe, 2003; Fung, 2006). Judicial 
torture in imperial China thus is not so much a legal tool, as it was in medieval 
Europe, to extract information and statements necessary for a legitimate 
conviction, but rather an extreme case in which law and morality become one—
what Confucianism morality ‘forbids’, the law ‘punishes’. 
 
On the other hand, perhaps more importantly, this ‘persuasive’ interrogation 
model could survive over a millennium in imperial China, not only because 
social consensus unified law and morality, but also because of the model’s 
inherent connection with increased imperial hierarchical powers. As already 
suggested, Confucian codes of morality (li) such as xiao (filial piety, 孝) and 
family loyalty were enforced by legalistic (fa) reward and punishment 
machineries. In this way, the throne, through unrelenting fortification of familial 
and social hierarchies, transformed the family into a de facto extension of the 
bureaucratic state (Windrow, 2006). Indeed, members of society that held 
relative power in informal positions, such as father and brother, had an interest 
in maintaining the social order through the mediation of conflicts, because the 
restoration of order granted them power and prestige over their subordinates. 
Moreover, imperial law unequivocally gave parents extended rights, ranging 
from the right to punish children physically to the right to command their 
child’s suicide for moral reasons (Ren, 1997:27). The result in theory, and to a 
remarkable degree in practice, was a system designed to educate wrongdoers in 
a subtly graded way, which began with the minor ‘punishment’ fathers used to 
force their children to confess and recognize moral faults. It then increased to 
still minor but sometimes different devices available to intervening authorities, 
and finally climaxed with the potential application of more severe torture 
inflicted by formal legal authorities. This complex gradation ensured that 
informal, socially-based enforcement of social norms occurred continually and 
finally fortified people’s deference to authorities, leading ultimately to 
consolidation of power in the hands of the throne. Under this social structure, 
district magistrates, members of the real ruling class of society, could maintain 
their enormous power and authority in courtrooms. In contrast, criminal 
suspects were put in a disadvantageous position both interactively and socio-
culturally. Hence, magistrates, as interrogators, could fully exercise their 
interactive power to humiliate and attack suspected criminals’ moral sense, or 
even torture them, to elicit confession and remorse. 
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4.4 Legal Changes in Late Imperial China 
Under the Tang (618-907) and Song (960-1279) dynasties, China was among 
the leading cultures of the world, far superior to Europe in wealth, technology 
and science (Moise, 1994). However, by the time of the Ming dynasty (1368-
1644), China had gradually fallen into decline. By the middle of the nineteenth 
century, the continuous isolationist policy adopted by the Qing dynasty (1644-
1911) was beginning to break down in the face of European military threats. 
After several failures to resist foreign military attacks, especially the failure of 
the Boxer Uprising in 1900, Empress Dowager Cixi (1835-1908) finally accepted 
the necessity of changing the mode of governance in accordance with the 
changing circumstances to stay in power. Hence, new policies (xinzheng, 新政) 
were initiated, including the revision of the legal system. In 1904, further 
spurred by foreign pressures and high-ranking officials, the Bureau of Legal 
Codification was established to draft a new series of codes, including criminal 
and criminal procedure law. Shen Jiaben (1840-1913), the co-director of the 
Bureau, combining Confucian ethical norms with German and Japanese models 
of punishment and due process, hoped to revive the ideal of a benevolent 
government (renzheng, 仁政) that punished lightly (xingqing, 刑轻) and forbade 
extracting confessions through torture (Dikötter, 2002). It was due to efforts of 
Shen and his colleagues that the government put into effect the ‘New Penal 
Code of the Great Qing’ in January 1911. In this legal document, corporal 
punishment and extracting confessions by torture were outlawed. Although 
some legalists considered this code ‘conservative’ and numerous articles argued 
for the preservation of the Confucian legal tradition, the dominant view still 
seems to be that it is an important landmark in China’s legal modernization 
(Wang, 1997). However, the first wave of legal modernization could not take 
root during the turbulent period following the Qing dynasty’s collapse. 
 
4.5 The Mao Era: the ‘Lawless’ State and Traditional 
Legal Culture 
Chinese Communists often claimed establishment of the PRC in 1949 was a 
total break with China’s ‘feudal’ past (Gelatt, 1982). Replacing Confucianism, 
Marxism-Leninism became the official orthodoxy guiding social transformations 
and governing other facets of national affairs. Notably, Marxism has a poor 
opinion of law. Marxists argue that the capitalist law is nothing more than a 
suppressive tool, which traditionally served the interests of a wealthy minority. 
When a proletarian revolution succeeds, the state gradually withers away and 
law will not be needed (Engels, 1979:164). In the interim, law serves to advance 
the socialist revolution towards communism and maintain the socialist order. 
More precisely, ’law is to be used by the proletariat as a weapon in class 
struggles against the enemy in order to realize the people’s democratic 
dictatorship‘ (Peerenboom, 2002:44). Owing to the dominance of a heavily 
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instrumental understanding of law in the Mao era, the legal restraints on the 
power of police in criminal interrogations varied in accordance with the changes 
in the official attitude towards law and depended largely on the political mode 
towards class struggles (Wu and Vander Beken, 2012). Free of substantial 
restraints, the aspiration of the investigator to capture the suspect as a 
testimonial resource is perfectly ‘understandable’. The suspect is, after all, the 
most efficient possible witness in the investigator’s eyes (Cui, 2003). 
Consequently, there have been frequent reports of brutality in interrogations 
that clearly amount to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and sometimes 
even ‘torture’ under contemporary international law (Chen, 2000). 
 
At this point, one question arises. No doubt, this type of law enforcement 
must exercise a great deal of discretion so that its key players can manipulate the 
interrogation procedure to meet practical needs. To understand this issue, one 
should not overlook the influence of the traditional Chinese legal culture, which 
enhanced rulers’ real and symbolic status as the locus of political authority. 
Although, literally, Marxism has little in common with the Chinese tradition, the 
influence of Confucianism and legalist values remained a strong driving force in 
Communist China even though this was not officially recognized (Ren 1997; 
Peerenboom, 2002). 
 
In the process of building a new elite power structure, the Communists 
departed from the imperial thrones that had stressed family loyalty by 
displaying higher loyalty to the state. During the early decades of the socialist 
construction, the informal social control preferred by Confucianism was largely 
institutionalized through an urban household registration system, which linked 
individuals’ residency with their entitlement to social programs. The strict 
control of population mobility effectuated different social control mechanisms in 
community, which were primarily responsible for handling local disputes and 
wrongdoers who had committed minor offences (Whyte and Parish, 1984). 
When individuals violated rules under the Security Administration Punishment 
Act,34 the police had the authority to impose a series of administrative sanctions 
without formal litigation. Notably, the formal court process was reserved only 
for offenders who committed serious crimes, especially the so-called class 
enemies who did not accept and support the Communist leadership (Rojek, 
1985). In this manner, the Communist leaders enforced stratifications within the 
civil society between those who supported the socialist state and those who did 
not, and thus created a web of status and privilege in the criminal justice sphere 
to bolster their own legitimacy. Under this arrangement, traditional shaming, 
moral control, and mutual checks were, to some extent, as effective as in 
previous eras (Rojek, 1985; Lu and Drass, 2002). As a result, in the 
interrogational rooms, the questioners (i.e. the police, the procuratorate, and the 
judge), who were both the representatives of the state power and ‘moral 
                                                             
34 Promulgated in October 1957. 
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executors’, enjoyed enormous authority. The justice officials generally had a 
strong sense of responsibility and moral consciousness to persuade suspects to 
confess (Ren, 1997:130). On the contrary, suspects, as in imperial times, were still 
in a socio-culturally disadvantageous position. They were supposed to be 
obedient and cooperate totally 35  in the questioning (Ren, 1997:119-122). 
Nevertheless, just as laws do not create a lawful society, morals do not create a 
moral order. The striking contrast in power between the two status groups also 
gave the law enforcement great space for manipulation. Therefore, it is not 
difficult to understand why ‘voluntary’ cooperation and confession in judicial 
questioning during that ‘lawless’ period may not have been voluntary at all. 
 
4.6 The Reform Era: ‘Modern’ Legal Rules and 
Answering Questions Truthfully 
Upon Mao’s death and the subsequent political downfall of the ‘Gang of 
Four’ in 1976, the CCP’s devotion to the political struggle against class enemies 
faded away. The new CCP leadership quickly launched the modernization 
programme which was summarized as the ‘Four Modernizations’—
modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and 
technology (Moise, 1994:194). In the meantime, many Party leaders, having 
suffered personally and severely during the lawless period of the Cultural 
Revolution, were eager to advocate greater reliance on the law as a means of 
preventing the recurrence of such policy-driven excesses. In addition, 
strengthening the legal system was also considered essential to win back 
legitimacy both at home and abroad and to provide an orderly environment for 
economic development (Peerenboom, 2002:55). 
 
Since then, the new leadership in China has made rapid progress on the 
legislative front. Notably, the first step it took after the ten-year turbulence was 
the promulgation of criminal law and criminal procedure law (CPL) in 1979. The 
promulgation of these two laws no doubt marked the beginning of the 
redevelopment of China’s criminal justice system (Leng, 1982). Despite 
remarkable progress, legal scholars and criminal justice practitioners noted 
various deficiencies in the 1979 CPL in the ensuing years (Ma, 2003). Specifically, 
there was broad consensus that the law still marginalized the rights of the 
suspect (Fu, 1998). In an effort to progress towards judicial democratization and 
fairness, China revised the 1979 CPL in 1996. 
 
                                                             
35 The suspect’s deference to legal authority was further fostered by the official slogan 
of ‘leniency to those who confess their crimes and severity to those who refuse to’ 
(Bao and Chelminski, 1973: 33). 
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4.6.1 The Criminal Interrogation Rules under the 1996 CPL 
Structures and concepts influenced by the West had already undoubtedly 
found their way into Chinese legislation. Nevertheless, the drafting of legal texts 
was always influenced by historical experiences from which the texts were 
derived and viewed in light of the rationale behind their application. The 1996 
CPL is no exception. In general, the content of the 1996 CPL is in no way similar 
to that of the old imperial codes. However, if one compares the central features 
of contemporary interrogation procedure with those of the ‘persuasive’ imperial 
type, it is apparent that many ideas are common to both. The current 
questioning procedure still seems to focus on objective fact-finding and to 
similarly persuade the suspect to respond to the incriminating evidence against 
him, thereby fostering a high level of self-incriminating statements or 
confessions. 
 
4.6.1.1 Proper Preparation Prior to the Initial Interrogation 
Under the 1996 CPL, the police are given power to interrogate a suspect 
under two types of situations: 
 
(1) The police may interrogate a suspect after he/she is detained or arrested 
and taken into police custody (1996 CPL, Art. 65, 72); and 
 
(2) The police may summon a suspect, who need not be detained or arrested, 
to a designated place in the city or county where he/she stays for interrogation, 
or the suspect may be interrogated at his/her residence (1996 CPL, Art. 92). 
 
These clauses definitely do not imply that, whenever a crime happens, the 
police have the power to interrogate whomever they please. In the first situation, 
after a suspect is detained in the detention house, as a typical investigatory act 
during criminal investigation, the police may interrogate the suspect. In the 
second situation, the police officer in charge, who must be at or above the county 
level, shall determine the necessity of questioning.36 In essence, the revised CPL 
endeavours to limit the initial police investigation to sources of objective 
information other than potentially guilty parties. Nonetheless, this does not 
imply that it minimized the consideration of the suspect as an important source 
of testimonial evidence overall (Zhu, 2006:15-16). The revised law arguably 
devotes considerable attention to the interrogation preconditions in order to 
make the questioning effective and productive. There is clearly a strong 
emphasis on proper preparation prior to interviews. The law states explicitly 
that, before the interrogation, the investigator should acquaint himself with the 
                                                             
36 Ministry of Public Security: Regulation on the Procedures of Handling Criminal 
Cases by Public Security Agencies (Article 173). 
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case and its supporting evidence, and then plan and outline the questioning 
process.37 
 
4.6.1.2 Persuasion based on Listening and Evidence 
During the interrogation, without the aid of a counsel,38 a suspect is expected 
to answer questions asked by investigators truthfully and can refuse to respond 
to only those questions that are irrelevant to the case (1996 CPL, Art. 93). In 
addition, the law pays special attention to the types of questions that need to be 
asked sequentially during the questioning. According to Article 93 of the 1996 
CPL, ‘when interrogating a suspect, the investigators shall first ask the suspect 
whether or not he has committed any criminal act, and let him state the 
circumstances of his guilt or explain his innocence; then they may ask him 
questions’. Under this arrangement, the police, as the imperial magistrates, may 
sit back at the beginning and hope that damaging evidence will arise if a guilty 
suspect’s concocted story crumbles upon subsequent disclosure of evidence. 
Such damaging evidence may arise in the form of inconsistency in the account 
given by the suspect, thereby demonstrating the lies told by the suspect, or in the 
form of failure to answer the questions posed by the police. All this evidence 
could be used either to encourage suspects to confess or against them at their 
trials (Wei, 2003). 
 
4.6.2 No Real Change of the Criminal Interrogation Rules under the 
2012 CPL 
On 14 March 2012, the National People’s Congress (NPC), China’s 
parliament, adopted the revision to the Criminal Procedure Law at the closing 
meeting of its annual session. Although the new CPL (2012 CPL), which takes 
effect on 1 January 2013, highlights the principle of protecting human rights in 
the criminal proceedings (Art. 2), the law continues to emphasize the importance 
of being honest in police interrogation39. The new amendment is intended to 
further protect the suspect’s defence rights and other procedural rights (2012 
CPL, Art. 14), and it doubtless does so to some extent. According to Article 37 of 
                                                             
37 Ibid. Article 178. 
38 Compared to the 1979 CPL, the 1996 CPL improved the rights of the suspect in 
various ways, but did not include the right to have a lawyer during police 
questioning. Only after the first interrogation or from the day on which compulsory 
measures are adopted does the suspect have the right to see his attorney (1996 CPL, 
Art. 96). 
39  Li Zhaoxing, spokesman for the Fifth Session of the 11th NPC, said that the 
amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law … ‘highlights the principle of protecting 
human rights and punishing criminals as a whole’.  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-03/04/c_131445010.htm (last visited 
July 31 2012). 
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the 2012 CPL, the defense lawyer40 should be granted access to his detained 
client within 48 hours after the request for meeting is made and all the lawyer-
suspect meetings must not be monitored. In the chapter on evidence (2012 CPL, 
Chapter V Evidence), the law states explicitly that no one can be forced to prove 
his own guilt (Art. 50), while provisions on how to rule out illegally obtained 
evidence have been added (Art. 54, 55, 56, 57, 58). Nevertheless, notably, Article 
118 of the 2012 CPL still provides that ‘the criminal suspect shall answer the 
investigators’ questions truthfully’. Furthermore, a new paragraph is added as 
Paragraph 2 to Article 118, which reads: ‘when interrogating criminal suspects, 
investigators shall inform the criminal suspect of the legal provisions allowing 
for leniency for those who truthfully confess their crimes’. Seen in this way, the 
defense lawyer’s role and other procedural safeguards within the Chinese 
interrogational procedure serve to demonstrate that the investigative officials 
adhere to the rules rather than lead to less self-incriminating statements or 
confessions. Eliciting reliable information and factual accounts from a person 
about an alleged offence is still the key purpose here. Thus it seems that the 2012 
CPL hardly represents a ‘real’ change in Chinese interrogation rules. 
 
4.6.3 Law in Practice and the Limits of the Black Letter Law 
In summary, consistent with the traditional Chinese philosophy of 
legitimizing power in terms of one’s responsibility to explicitly defined roles, the 
current Chinese interrogation procedure grounds the discretion of the police in 
criminal interrogation in terms of their role in being impartial41 and professional 
in truth-finding. Accordingly, unlike in Europe, where the suspect’s actions in 
criminal questioning are institutionally structured by the jurisdictional 
parameters of his ability to exercise his autonomy, in China, the suspect’s 
behaviour is restricted by the pertinent relationships that demand obedience, or 
honesty, during the questioning process. This interrogation model is justified by 
the belief that it is the duty of both the police and the suspect to conform to their 
roles in order to eliminate ambiguity and arrive at the ‘truth’. 
 
However, such expectations do not bear out in practice. Many Chinese 
scholars, relying on different sources, such as interviews with present and 
former law enforcement officers or individual field observation, have made the 
alarming assertion that the problem of confessions produced by xingxun (刑讯)—
                                                             
40  Article 33 of the 2012 CPL stipulates that ‘during the period of criminal 
investigation, a criminal suspect may only retain a lawyer as a defender’. 
41 Though judicial torture in criminal investigations is part of the dim and dark 
history of Chinese criminal law, today’s China, by virtue of provisions of criminal 
procedure and criminal law, forbids the practice wherein suspects or the accused 
should be forced, by actual or metaphorical ‘arm-twisting’, to respond to police 
questioning (1996 CPL, Art. 43; the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
Art. 247, 234, 232). 
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physical force or psychological duress—is widespread in police questionings in 
China (Wu and Van der Beken, 2010). In addition, Cui (2003: 26) comments thus 
on the fatal effect of police coercion on the reliability of evidence: ‘Although 
confessions elicited by xingxun are not always false, wrongful convictions, with 
no exception, are all because of xingxun’. 
 
Literature on the causes of police-coerced confessions in criminal 
interrogations covers a wide range of topics in terms of the levels of analysis. 
Notably, besides loopholes or shortcomings in the law 42  and the ineffective 
institutional mechanisms for controlling state powers, some socio-legal studies 
also consider the influence of traditional cultural values a reason for coerced 
confessions. While coerced confession is absolutely cruel, its exercise depends at 
almost every level on many forms of cooperation and consensus (Lin, Yu, and 
Zhang, 2006; Lin, Zhao and Huang, 2006). To understand further the social and 
cultural background that has led to the persistence of such pernicious 
interrogation practices, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that one must 
consider the relationship between the interrogator and suspect in criminal 
investigations. An analysis of this relationship, at both macro and micro levels, is 
presented as follows. 
 
The ‘Paternalistic’43 Criminal Justice System 
 
First, on a macro level, China is still a ‘paternalistic’ state in which law 
enforcement is likely to have the real and symbolic status as the protector of 
anonymous collective interests, such as public security or social stability. This 
engenders a tendency to ignore concrete interests of individual suspects and lose 
                                                             
42 For example, studies demonstrate that the 1996 CPL permits lawyers’ involvement 
at the stage of police investigation, but neither the CPL nor any supplementary 
regulations contain sufficient procedural safeguards to ensure that the lawyers 
discharge their duties properly (Fu 1998; Ma 2003). In the law, after the first time the 
suspect is interrogated by the police or from the date coercive measures were used 
on him, the suspect can retain a lawyer to offer legal advice, or to serve as his 
representative in the proceedings to file petitions and complaints (1996 CPL, Art. 96). 
However, this provision is subject to exceptions in special circumstances. If a case 
involves state secrets, the suspect shall obtain the approval of the investigation organ 
to retain a lawyer, and he shall ask for further permission to meet or correspond with 
his legal counsel (1996 CPL, Art. 96). In addition, the police may be present during 
the lawyer–suspect meetings according to the circumstance of the case and the 
‘necessity’ (1996 CPL, Art. 96). Articles 14 and 16 of the Regulation on Lawyers’ 
Participation in Criminal Procedure Activity issued by the Ministry of Public 
Security further restrains the lawyer–suspect encounter by granting the police the 
power to stop a lawyer’s ‘unlawful’ conduct or even suspend a lawyer–-suspect 
meeting on the grounds that the lawyer had violated the rules of the meeting place. 
43 Chinese patriarchy fundamentally differs from that found in the West. Please refer 
to footnote 27. 
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sight of the abuse of power by investigators within the sphere of crime and 
justice. 
 
Although the CCP has made a series of mistakes since it came into power in 
1949, in Peerenboom’s (2002:42) view, ‘the image [of the Chinese government] 
remains the same: the father, knowing what is best, takes care of his children’. 
Today, the CCP leadership largely decides what is best for Chinese society and 
takes ameliorative action to solve contemporary problems. In the last three 
decades, the state’s economic policy proved to be spectacularly successful, 
improving the Chinese citizens’ living conditions over a relatively short period 
while at the same time creating a high rate of long-term economic growth 
(Peerenboom, 2006). The Chinese government clearly understands the 
importance of maintaining stability, which is a prerequisite for economic growth 
and for the CCP’s continuous legitimacy and popularity. Hence, to satisfy the 
practical need for more effective social control, the current Chinese criminal 
justice system altered the principles of law and punishment established during 
the Mao era in some ways and adopted Confucianism and legalist legacies in 
others. As in the pre-reform era, the police, without court approval, have the 
authority to impose administrative sanctions on individuals guilty of minor 
crimes and public order violations. Wrongdoers are dealt with by the criminal 
justice system only when serious offences are involved. Although the police’s 
administrative power, which was once used to control urban transients, has been 
eliminated under the 1996 CPL, their power for detaining criminal suspects has 
been extended. Thus, unquestionably, compared with those of European law 
enforcement, Chinese police have greater authority and power over ordinary 
citizens (Ma, 1997). 
 
Apart from the political agenda, another crucial factor that further reinforces 
the authority of the police lies in the social changes that have occurred in 
Chinese civil society in the reform era. Since 1978, as China moved towards a 
market economy, the traditional informal social control that relied on rigid 
household registration and employment structures has declined (Dutton, 2000). 
Concurrently, increased mobility has resulted in a class of “floating population” 
(liudongrendou, 流动人口), who are often blamed for urban problems, including 
the soaring crime rates. Given that transients have no attachment, commitment, 
or involvement in communities, using the criminal justice system to subject them 
to stronger formal control is deemed necessary by urban citizens to curtail crime 
(Lu and Drass, 2002). Moreover, as police officers, following the ‘mass-line’ in 
policing, actually live and work in certain neighbourhoods for a long time, most 
Chinese citizens do not view the police as a force limiting their freedom, but as a 
service resource they can rely on (Jiao, 2001). As a result, the formal law 
enforcement is shouldering more responsibility for solving crimes, thus 
reinforcing itself in both real and symbolic senses (Wong, 2001). 
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Importantly, as a group of legal professionals, Chinese defence counsels have 
not been a prominent force in furthering the balance of state power. In imperial 
China, the status of scriveners, who were labelled ‘litigation tricksters’, was 
considered low, because the pursuit of self-interest by adverse litigation is at 
odds with the paramount virtue of social harmony, as it signifies one’s refusal to 
take responsibilities for one’s action (Yu, 2002; Clark, 2008). Under socialist 
China, the state belongs to the people; thus, lawyers are not expected to oppose 
the state in a criminal investigation but shoulder the dual responsibilities of not 
only protecting the rights of the suspect but also, more importantly, helping the 
state seek the truth (Lu and Miethe, 2002; Clark, 2008). For millennia, China had 
no officially recognized legal profession, which means the use of legal counsel is 
rather new to the Chinese criminal justice system. Until recently, more than 70 
per cent of the criminal cases were processed without lawyers appearing in court 
on behalf of defendants (Wu, 2006a). In this context, Lu and Miethe (2002: 277) 
observed, ‘contrary to the image of an advocate of the defendant, Chinese 
attorneys under the reform policies still play a major role in legitimizing the 
current legal system’. Chinese counsels, especially seasoned attorneys, know 
how to obtain the best results for their clients by not being ‘combative’ or 
‘arrogant’, but instead ‘deferential’ and ‘submissive’ during criminal 
proceedings (Liu and Seymour, 1998). 
 
Undoubtedly, the current ‘paternalistic’ procedure structure in which the 
police have the sole responsibility for implementing procedural safeguards is 
dangerous if frequently unchallenged. Though coercive questioning, an extreme 
means to obtain objective evidence, implies weakness of the daily operations of 
the police,44 it can also be attributed to the ‘system’ of criminal justice that allows 
it to exist. As a whole, by relying heavily on confession to solve crimes, law 
enforcement is able to divert the available funds to other arguably more 
productive uses.45 
 
Interrogational Paternalism 
 
Second, on a micro level within the interrogation space, the relationship 
between the interrogator and the suspect has been and continues to be 
                                                             
44 Specifically, the daily operations of the police are undermined by budget shortages 
(Zhu, 2006; Chen, 2007) and poorly trained police officers (Wang, 2006); the police 
force is undersized and functions by using underdeveloped investigative methods 
(Zuo and Zhou, 2002; Wu, 2008). 
45 Chen (2007: 59) has argued that the importance of increasing national investment 
in criminal investigation has never been fully recognized by the Chinese 
government. Since the advent of an open economy and a reform policy, the 
government’s financial input in criminal investigations concerning personnel or 
technology has not increased concurrently with the significant rise in crime as well as 
the changes in crime patterns. Owing to a limited budget, some forensic techniques, 
like DNA testing, cannot be employed in crime investigation procedure (Chen, 2007). 
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‘paternalistic’. The attitude of criticizing wrongdoers for their unwillingness to 
repent for and admit to the crime facts, derived from the familist or paternalism 
tradition, continues to offer plenty of psychological comfort to the police. 
Although the ‘open-door’ policy has increased individualism in China, to a large 
extent, Confucian doctrines of xiao (孝) and family loyalty still strongly influence 
the modern Chinese family relationships (Whyte and Parish, 1984). It was 
suggested that the Chinese family often dominates individuals by forcing them 
to come to terms with family values and tradition (Lu, Zhang and Miethe, 2002). 
Given such moral cultivation, according to Fairbank (1987:31-32), ‘Chinese well 
habituated to the family system have been prepared to accept similar patterns of 
status in other institutions, including the official hierarchy of the government’. 
As a current research of court questioning in China shown, in Chinese criminal 
courtrooms questioning discourse is a persuasive process of obtaining a 
confession from defendants. To achieve the persuasive purpose, the presiding 
judge and procuratorate using various patterns of questioning in order to accuse 
and attack defendants’ moral senses in order to elicit confession or remorse 
(Chang, 2004, 718-719). Similarly, in the interrogation room, the suspect’s 
submissive and honest attitude seems to be considered legitimate and morally 
valid by interrogators. In addition, the societal view on crime and wrongdoers46 
gives law enforcement ‘additional moral legitimacy to take measures to coerce 
confessions and press for repentance’ (Ren, 1997:132). As a survey conducted in 
2006 shows, the public’s attitude towards pernicious police interrogation 
practices is tolerant, and even supportive (Lin, Zhao, and Huang, 2006: 133-4). 
 
5 Conclusion 
Ancient Greece and China differed markedly in their systems of thought. 
Greeks tended to engage in context-independent and analytic perceptual processes 
by focusing on a salient object (or person) independently of its context, whereas 
                                                             
46 The CPL declares that “the use of torture to extort confession and the collection of 
evidence by threats, enticement, deceit or other unlawful methods is strictly prohibited” 
(CPL, Art. 43). Further, torture is a crime, and the torturer can in serious cases be 
punished by life imprisonment or death (CCP, Art. 247, 234, 232). The stiff penalties, 
however, have not had much deterrent effect on police officers. Research based on 
interviews with police officers reports that Chinese police do not generally think of 
themselves as evil but rather seem to feel that coercing confessions is justified and 
they regard themselves as the guardians of the interests of society in combating 
crime and criminals (Wang, 2002; Wu, 2006b). It was observed that the police often 
abused Article 96 of the 1996 CPL to set the time and place for the lawyer-suspect 
meeting and be present at the meeting (Liu and Halliday, 2009). Notably, some senior 
ranks also share a similar view that the ends—convicting criminals—justify the 
means (Lin, Yu and Zhang, 2006). Wu (2006b: 161) discovered that legal authorities 
showed leniency towards the police involved in interrogational ‘torture’ cases, and 
the punishment rarely corresponded to the severity of the crime. 
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Chinese tended to engage in context-dependent and holistic perceptual processes 
by attending to the relationship between the object and the context in which the 
object was located. These two ancient civilizations in fact resulted in great 
difference between Europe and China in terms of their legal cultures and the 
institutional arrangements of their criminal justice systems. 
 
Europe believed fundamental law was itself divinely instituted and favoured 
a rational legal system in which law served as a systematic means to define 
jurisdictions. Since the boundaries of jurisdictions were clarified, law factually 
provided the formal means by which both legal officials and individual suspects 
could preserve personal spheres of power in criminal interrogations. Specifically, 
under medieval law, the rights of the accused were mainly based upon a 
purportedly objective assessment of the teachings of authoritative materials. 
Nonetheless, in modern Europe, individual rights and internal independence are 
highly respected. Hence, the principles of the right to silence and the privilege 
against self-incrimination were raised and seen as an expression of individual 
autonomy—the right of the accused to be respected as an individual throughout 
the criminal process and to reach an autonomous decision when called upon to 
answer to criminal allegations. 
 
In contrast, the Chinese, without transcendental sources of legitimation and 
under the strong influence of Confucian thought, built their legal system on 
assumptions of harmony among hierarchically arranged players. Precisely, in 
the imperial criminal procedure individuality was defined in terms of one’s 
responsibility to explicitly defined roles. The suspect, as a subordinate member 
in the family, had the obligation to be obedient and admit his moral guilt. The 
judge or magistrate, as the head of a family, had the authority and obligation to 
persuade the suspect to change his mind and confess based on evidence and 
patience. Hence, in theory, power is impersonal, non-intentional, and directed 
towards maintaining the harmony of the whole. In developmental terms, this 
line of reasoning emphasized the collective and intuitive sides of life and led to 
the specification of roles and of role-defined actions and emotions, a trend that 
in turn reduced the legitimate discretionary spheres of individual action. 
Consistent with the traditional Chinese legal culture, the suspect’s behaviour 
under the current Chinese interrogation procedure continues to be ‘restricted’47 
by the pertinent relationships that demand obedience, that is, honesty, during 
the questioning process. 
 
Considering future legal reforms in China, given the very different historical 
and institutional context, the likelihood of an ‘autonomous version’ of the right 
to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination in China’s very different 
                                                             
47 There is no provision in the law as to the consequences that follow from a suspect’s 
silence, such as the fact finder drawing unfavourable inferences from a passive 
reaction.  
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soil seems low. In the reform era, as indicated, the attitude of being honest about 
one’s misconduct, and submissive to authority have continued to be reinforced 
by Chinese familism, especially the concept of xiao (孝). This is not to say that 
other external pressures of the kind mentioned at the beginning of this paper—
such as the pressure on the PRC to comply with the ‘universal’ norms—will not 
make the content of new interrogation rules profoundly different from that of 
the past, difficult as this may be to accomplish. As long as the familist and 
societal view of crime and wrongdoers holds sway, the real question is whether 
new content can overcome hoary practices, values, and interpretations. Notably, 
although the 2012 CPL, which takes effect on 1 January 2013, highlights the 
principle of protecting human rights in the criminal proceedings (Art. 2), the law 
continues to emphasize the importance of being honest in police interrogation. 
Article 118 of the 2012 CPL provides that ‘the criminal suspect shall answer the 
investigators’ questions truthfully’. Furthermore, a new paragraph is added as 
Paragraph 2 to Article 118, which reads: ‘when interrogating criminal suspects, 
investigators shall inform the criminal suspect of the legal provisions allowing 
for leniency for those who truthfully confess their crimes’. At this point, it 
should be noted that Chinese law was embedded in an altogether different 
ideological context than the one that gave rise to the right to remain silent in the 
West. As already seen, the imperial Chinese law is largely moralistic in nature. 
Since the Han dynasty, Confucian’s moral standards, particularly those dealing 
with contrition, patriarchal relationships and familial obligations, started to 
become a part of the content of law, and legalist’s reward and punishment 
machineries became the instruments for executing such content. Hence, the 
better way to comprehend the above mentioned provisions is not to consider 
them manifestations of caprice on the part of the present Chinese leadership, but 
rather to recognize them as expressions of the inherent Chinese legal attitude 
which the Chinese lawmakers want to respect and enhance. Pound (1948: 751) 
once emphasized that many plausible legal reform projects have been slow in 
achieving their purposes, and more than a few have failed, because they break 
with the past too violently or fail to take into account long-settled habits of 
thought of action. Therefore, if the ‘human rights’ standards would be 
interpreted and applied in the Chinese context, it is crucial to remember that 
legal precepts have to be fitted to the lives of the people they are to govern, not 
the lives of people arbitrarily fitted to the legal precepts. 
 
As Posner (1990) rightly argues, laws are not abstract, sacred entities, but 
socially determined goads for shaping behaviour so as to conform to society’s 
values. Indeed, there can be no wisdom in the choice of a path unless one knows 
where it will lead. Based on this paper’s preceding analysis, it may well be 
established that traditional Chinese moral values are supportive of an ethical 
approach to criminal investigation and a cooperative interviewing style in 
questioning the suspect. Similarly, in many Western countries, there is a 
tendency to use the concept of ‘investigative interviewing’ as an alternative to 
interrogation. For instance, in the United Kingdom (UK), the expression 
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‘investigative interviewing’ is used to describe questioning of suspects and 
victims, as well as witnesses, at any point in the investigative process 
(Williamson, 1993; Gudjonsson, 1994). Underpinning the new approach of 
criminal interviewing is a firm commitment to move from questioning purely to 
obtain a confession, towards questioning that is more of an inquiry—examining 
and adding to the existing evidence (Williamson, 1993). This change is a result of 
the combined effects of new legislation, psychological development, and 
organizational policies designed to make the questioning of a suspect less 
inherently coercive. It is hoped that this ethical approach to investigation would 
elicit reliable information and factual accounts from a person about an alleged 
offence (Brewer and Williams, 2005). 
 
Therefore, in any event, many of the most pressing obstacles for the 
implementation of fair interrogation standards in China have nothing to do with 
Confucian philosophies. Rather, they are institutional in nature. Historically, 
Chinese leadership, through the interplay between Confucianism’s moral 
standards and legalist bureaucracy, relied heavily on informal means to 
maintain social order and settle disputes, and established a powerful, minimalist 
law enforcement authority, which was responsible only for conflicts that could 
not be solved by informal mechanisms and for serious crimes. On the whole, this 
social control model, which required tremendous ‘faith’ in the credibility of the 
judicial authorities, failed to adequately address the need to protect individuals 
against law enforcement interrogation practices that were abusive or 
overreaching, and therefore indirectly contributed to the prevalence of police-
coerced confession both in the past and present. In light of this, how traditional 
moral obligations, for both the interviewer and interviewee, could best be 
combined with institutional restrictions, should be a central concern underlying 
future research on interrogative practices within the Chinese criminal justice 
system. Since it has been long recognized in the West that standing legal orders 
and forced instructions have a limited effect on police questioning (Leo, 1992; 
Gudjonsson, 1994), it may well prove to be an advantage that China already has 
a traditional moral philosophical body of ethical customs. As we have already 
seen, there is a strong emphasis in the Chinese criminal justice system on proper 
planning and preparation prior to questioning and on personal integrity48 during 
questioning. This body of customs may become a body of ideals around which 
the adjustment of relations and ordering of conduct in criminal interviewing 
may be shaped. 
 
 
                                                             
48 As observed, there is a strong emphasis in the Chinese criminal justice system on 
the moral duty of both legal officials and individual suspects to conform to their roles 
in order to eliminate ambiguity and arrive at the ‘truth’ in criminal interviewing. 
Moreover, Confucian’s relationships also stress a sense of reciprocity (bao 报), that is, 
those who have increased authority shall also have increased responsibilities. 
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